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MITIGATING POST-ACQUISITION RISK:  
THE INTERPLAY OF CROSS-BORDER UNCERTAINTIES 
 






Do international acquisitions increase acquirers’ risk? If so, can cross-border 
uncertainties interact and offset such risk? The perspective of integrated risk 
management suggests international acquirers could mitigate their overall risk 
through the interplay of various levels of uncertainties. Using asset pricing to 
measure shifts in risk and a large sample of international acquisitions by US firms 
during 2000-2014, we find that acquirers can reduce their risk by trading internal and 
deal-level risk factors (information asymmetry and moral hazard) off against external 
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Despite the substantial uncertainty surrounding the global marketplace, the market of international mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) has been particularly active. Due to the exciting and often contentious nature of 
M&A activities, scholars from various disciplines have studied the acquisition behaviour of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) extensively. Even with the wealth of research, international M&As have been reported 
to present very high failure rates, often ranging between 45% and 67% (Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). 
While risk is a well-defined predictor of failure, most studies place a disproportionate focus on the return 
side of performance (Lee & Caves, 1998; Park & Russo, 1996). To better understand the high failure rate 
of M&As, the examination of M&A risk is essential. Thus, in this article, we investigate whether cross-
border M&As involve increased risk for the acquirer and if so what international acquirers should do to 
offset the increased risk.  
The theoretical foundation of our paper lies in Miller’s (1992) perspective of integrated risk 
management, suggesting international acquirers should utilize simultaneous trade-offs among various levels 
of uncertainties for strategic international risk management. In other words, the various uncertainties 
encountered by an MNE can interplay and reduce the firm’s overall risk. Building on Miller’s (1992) work, 
a small number of scholars find that MNEs can actually utilize integrated risk management to reduce risk 
across varied contexts. Shrader, Oviatt, and McDougall (2000) show how new ventures can manage their 
risk by trading three factors off against each other: foreign location, entry mode, and the proportion of 
revenue exposed to certain locations. Das and Teng (1998) recommend understanding the behaviour of 
strategic alliances by integrating resource and risk dimensions. In supply chain risk management, it is crucial 
to acknowledge the interacting effects of supply risks, demand risks, and operational risks (Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008). In line with this important body of literature, our study employs the integrated risk 
management perspective in the context of cross-border M&As. 
Among the extant research on cross-border M&As, the studies of Chari and Chang (2009) and 
Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino (2004) stand out for probing the risk dimension of M&As. Building on 
their significant developments, our study offers two extensions: First, while these studies focus on a single 
source of risk, we address risk more holistically. Specifically, Reuer et al. (2004) examine risk mitigation by 
performance-contingent payout (i.e., stock payment or earnouts). Since contingent payout is a payment 
method that depends on the success of the deal and the performance of the target, it addresses the 
information asymmetry problem and transfers the acquirer’s downside risk to the target. Nonetheless, 
information asymmetry, leading to the risk of adverse selection, is only one source of risk in cross-border 
M&As. Chari and Chang (2009), on the other hand, explore the determinants of share of equity. While 
share of equity does have implications for resource commitment, risk, returns, and control, it is not an 
explicit measure of risk. Expanding on these two studies, we address the risk of cross-border M&As via a 
more direct and precise approach. Second, the above studies directly examine the determinants or risk 
factors, which shows that they assume the factors are competing rather than complementary in nature. In 
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contrast, we emphasize the complementary interplay effect among the sources of risk, and allow the risk 
factors to interact with each other.  
International M&A research concludes that the key risk factors are information asymmetry, moral 
hazard, and country-level uncertainties such as the “liability of foreignness” and “double-layered 
acculturation” (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). The “liability of foreignness” 
stresses the social cost of doing business abroad, which results from the unfamiliarity that foreign firms 
face (Eden & Miller, 2004). A foreign firm engaged in M&As also deals with the issue of double-layered 
acculturation, which refers to the cultural distances at both the country and corporate level (Barkema et al., 
1996). To understand the behaviour of cross-border M&A risk and to assess the efficacy of mitigation 
channels, we exploit the complementary and competing effects of these risk factors through their indicators: 
industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Industry relatedness indicates the 
organizational similarity in terms of business traits and goals, which implies the degree of information 
asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Institutional distance is the key driver behind the “liability of 
foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Finally, cultural distance at the country level measures the outer layer 
of “double-layered acculturation”.  
Using a sample of 1,874 international acquisitions by US firms from 2000 to 2014, we find 
significant moderating effects among industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance on 
acquirers’ post-acquisition risk. For instance, while industry relatedness on its own increases post-
acquisition systematic risk, the presence of cultural distance can (at least partially) offset such risk effects. 
In other words, if a firm acquires a related target in a culturally distant country, post-takeover risk decreases. 
If, on the other hand, the target is in a culturally similar country, the acquirer experiences an even more 
pronounced increase in risk. Therefore, “double-layered acculturation” can act as a risk mitigation scenario 
for cross-border acquirers. Futhermore, the increased risk from industry relatedness can also be mitigated 
by institutional distance, especially when the related targets are from upstream institutions (i.e., countries 
with better institutional development than the US). Lastly, we find that acquirers’ risk declines when the 
targets are from upstream countries with both culturally and institutionally distant environments. Our 
results therefore support our theoretical proposition: strategic international risk, examined in the context 
of cross-border M&As in our study, is subject to an array of simultaneous trade-offs among the risks of 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and target-country distance.  
 Our study provides three contributions. First, we bridge a gap in the international business (IB) 
literature on risk as the performance outcome; while the literature is rich with theory and empirical evidence 
on the outcomes of internationalization strategies, it is disproportionately focused on returns. However, 
returns are just one facet of performance, which cannot illustrate the full outcomes of internationalization. 
Along with the attainment of economic rents, managing risks is a primary objective of firms operating 
internationally (Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 1992). By studying risk as the performance outcome, we open a 
debate to investigate, quantify, and mitigate strategic international risks. Second, we contribute to the theory 
of integrated risk management (Miller, 1992). The dominant theories explaining the cross-border M&A 
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phenomenon are transaction cost economics (TCE), ownership-location-internalization (OLI), and the 
resource-based view (RBV). While these theories build a strong foundation within this body of literature, 
Miller’s framework provides a unique perspective on theorizing about cross-border M&A risk. Our study 
extends his integrated risk framework in the specific context of cross-border M&As. We posit that acquirers 
can leverage internal factors from deal-level characteristics to offset external risks coming from country-
level factors. Third, we contribute to the cross-border M&A literature by providing a measure of risk. 
Despite the extensive research on cross-border M&As, we are not close to explaining the high failure rates 
as we tend to overlook risk (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Scholars have 
recently focused on examining abnormal returns as the performance measure. Abnormal returns estimate 
the difference between actual and expected returns, which assumes risk to be time-invariant across pre- and 
post-announcement periods. Thus, they fail to account for possible shifts in the volatility – hence the risk 
– of stock returns. Instead, we measure the acquirers’ post-acquisition shift in systematic risk from the 
difference between pre- and post-announcement periods, using the Carhart Four-Factor Model (Lubatkin 
& O’Neill, 1987).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
framework and put forward testable hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical data and methodology. 
The fourth section illustrates the results and the fifth provides robustness checks for our study. The last 




As one of the primary objectives of MNEs, risk management is a critical area in need of contemporary 
theorization and quantitative mitigation (Ghoshal, 1987; Lee & Caves, 1998). In the past, scholars and risk 
managers have treated risk purely in terms of one particular type of uncertainty, excluding other existing 
ones. With the development of globalization and technology, the risk manager is increasingly becoming 
involved in managing a broader spectrum of risks facing the firm (Colquitt, Hoyt, & Lee, 1999). In the 
context of IB, MNEs face various and numerous levels of uncertainties, ranging from the firm level to the 
general environmental level, which makes IB inherently risky. The complexity of uncertainties for MNEs 
drove the development of integrated risk management especially for IB (Miller, 1992, 1998). Specifically, 
Miller (1992) proposed a framework with multiple dimensions of risks for international businesses. These 
multiple dimensions of risks are suggested to be simultaneously determined, or interrelated, rather than 
operating independently of each other. Truly, MNEs’ financial (or foreign exchange) risk is highly related 
to their strategic risk. The failure to hedge a firm’s exposure to foreign exchange risk would risk the success 
or performance of a firm’s strategies.  
Miller’s (1992) perspective of interdependencies between risk factors formulates his insight: 
managing those risks often involves trade-offs. A trade-off between exposures to various uncertainties 
means that a reduction of one uncertainty may result in increased exposure to another uncertainty (Miller, 
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1992). Thus, MNEs can manage multiple IB risks by trading one risk off against another to keep the overall 
risk lower than it would be without such trade-offs (Shrader et al., 2000). As mentioned before, IB scholars 
have theoretically developed and empirically tested the theory of integrated risk management in the context 
of new ventures, supply chain risk management, and strategic alliances. This paper further employs the 
theory in the context of international M&As, considering the various levels of risk factors acquirers face.   
Information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target is the primary risk factor in M&As, 
existing when the bidder lacks precise or sufficient information about the target (Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Reuer et al., 2004). When asymmetrical information prevails between two companies, the acquirer faces the 
risk of adverse selection (i.e., overpayment) due to an inaccurate evaluation of the target’s value or excessive 
transaction costs during the negotiation phase. As Mukherji et al. (2013) point out, information asymmetry 
is a major source of overbidding risk, particularly due to the misevaluation of intangible assets. In addition 
to adverse selection as the ex-ante valuation uncertainty (i.e., risk prior to deal completion), moral hazard 
problems (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Holmstrom, 1982) are also likely to occur both before and after 
deal completion. On the one hand, to the extent that CEOs influence board decisions on compensation, 
as supported by the “managerial power” view, acquisitions can be used by CEOs as justification for 
additional compensation (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Since compensation contracts are often not designed 
perfectly, managers may also be allowed to extract rents that are linked to the completion or size of a deal, 
rather than its performance3. On the other hand, following deal completion, information asymmetry 
between the owner and the manager – as well as that between the managers of the bidder and the target – 
may continue to exist. The acquirer is therefore exposed to further uncertainty and moral hazard problems, 
factors often cited as potential causes of integration failure (Chi, 1994). 
The risk of adverse selection and moral hazard problems are common factors in M&As, and are 
internal or endogenous uncertainties for acquirers. Following Gatignon and Anderson (1988), we consider 
risk factors that are limited to within organizations (i.e., the acquirer and the target) as internal uncertainty. 
These internal risk factors are exacerbated when it comes to cross-border M&As (Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988). In an international context, internal risk factors (adverse selection and moral hazard problems) are 
amplified by external influences such as the “liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Barkema et al., 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). Being exposed to “double-layered 
acculturation”, acquirers not only encounter the target’s different organizational culture but also often 
compete with its different national culture. These external risks result from differences in national culture, 
institutional environments, business practices, and customer behaviors, which heighten information 
asymmetry and complexity.  
Studies in international economics and finance have approached the issue from the theoretical and 
empirical lens of “familiarity” or cultural affinity (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009). In general, investors 
appear reluctant to hold the securities of firms they are not familiar with, a principle which also explains 
                                               
3 Grinstein and Hribar (2004) report that, in 4 out of 10 deals in their sample, deal completion was cited as a criterion for the 
provision bonuses, averaging over $1.4 million on top of any other compensation. 
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“home bias” in investment portfolios, overseas listing decisions etc. As Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) also 
reveal, investors may even present foreign bias, by overweighting their portfolios towards certain foreign 
markets, depending on the level of economic development, market capitalization, transaction costs, or any 
factors reducing information asymmetry. The same norm has been found to apply in overseas-listing 
decisions, with companies showing preferences for foreign markets with geographical proximity or other 
familiar characteristics, explaining the propensity of US issuers to cross-list in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and certain European countries. In the domain of cross-border M&As – where cross-cultural interactions 
between acquirers and targets are expected to be more intense – Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2011) 
document that the distance between origin and destination countries regarding critical informal institutions, 
such as cultural egalitarianism, not only explains the home bias in portfolio holdings and acquisition volume, 
but also the value destruction in cross-border M&As. Furthermore, Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi’s (2015) 
recent work gives further empirical support to the view that distance in cultural values negatively influences 
merger activity and acquirer returns. The above theoretical and empirical lens from international finance 
corroborates the IB paradigm that MNEs in general, and international acquirers in particular, face 
unfavorable odds when engaging in cross-border strategic investments.  
However, in cross-border acquisitions, internal risk factors (adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems) and external uncertainties (“liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”) are 
complementary and overlapping (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer & Koza, 2000). Moreover, these internal 
(firm-level) and external (country-level) uncertainties are interrelated and can thus be traded off against 
alternative firm strategies (Miller, 1992). In other words, according to Miller’s (1992) integrated risk 
management perspective, when a firm’s exposure to one level of uncertainty increases, its exposure to 
another level of uncertainty decreases, and the firm can manage its risk by adjusting its strategy through 
simultaneous trade-offs among the levels of uncertainties. To be more specific to our context, international 
acquirers can mitigate their risk by simultaneously trading the external uncertainties (“liability of 
foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”) off against internal uncertainties (adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems). From earlier studies, acquirers could passively mitigate their risk by controlling 
the equity sought or the payment method. In our study, we integrate the internal with the external risk 
factors, allowing the acquirers to mitigate their risk in an active fashion. We utilize such indicators of 
uncertainties as industry relatedness, institutional distance, and cultural distance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Industry Relatedness  
Synergy theory argues that related acquisitions – where acquirers and targets share strategic 
interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating level – will produce benefits (Capron, 
Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998). In related acquisitions, it is easier for the acquirer to evaluate the target’s 
business and value because of the similarities, reducing the degree of information asymmetry and 
subsequent moral hazard problems. Thus, the acquirer is – at least in theory – subject to a lower risk of 
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adverse selection (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer et al., 2004). However, many acquisitions that are potentially 
synergistic fail to create value or even ultimately lead to divestitures (Bergh, 1997; Davidson III, Rosenstein, 
& Sundaram, 2002). In order to benefit from operational synergies, related acquisitions require the bidders 
to invest heavily in implementation (or integration) after the deal. These implementation costs are higher 
in a cross-border context, due to the distance between the acquirer and the target in terms of culture, 
geography, and institutions (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016). In the meantime, the high implementation costs 
have a larger impact in an international context for related acquisitions than unrelated ones (Chakrabarti & 
Mitchell, 2016).  
Furthermore, the acquisition of related targets tends to drive acquirers’ confidence and hubris up 
because the acquirer feels they know enough about the target’s business (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). 
Assuming there is sufficient and symmetric information about the target’s business, an acquirer is more 
likely to underestimate the implementation costs and consolidation efforts. Integration costs often exceed 
the expected value of the synergies, thus contributing to value destruction and the risk of integration failure. 
By underestimating costs and under-resourcing consolidation efforts, acquirers are prone to neglect 
important administrative functions (Kitching, 1967). Therefore, the more related a target is, the higher the 
risk of administrative business and integration failure is.   
 Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that related acquisitions provide the acquirer with greater 
economies of scale and scope, while unrelated ones are likely to achieve financial and administrative 
synergies. Thus, unrelated cross-border acquisitions have more potential to lower the acquirer’s cost of 
capital (Chatterjee, 1986). As a lower cost of capital reduces the required rate of return on investment, it 
allows for further investment opportunities, thus bringing higher value and lower systematic risk for the 
firm, all other things being equal (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). In addition, unrelated overseas acquisitions 
are known to be more “satisfactory vehicles” for risk reduction than domestic ones, because of the 
diversification into international markets (Hisey & Caves, 1985; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002). We therefore 
expect that related cross-border M&As will be accompanied by higher risk than unrelated ones ceteris paribus. 
 
H1: Industry relatedness between the acquirer and the target increases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As. 
 
Cultural Distance 
The research on the impact of cultural distance on M&A outcomes has been inconclusive and contradictory 
(Björkman, Stahl, & Vaara, 2007; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). On the one hand, 
cultural distance at the country level may provide strengths and advantages to the acquirer, assuming they 
have pre-deal awareness of the cultural difference and are well-prepared for the challenges it will pose 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). On the other hand, cultural distance is found to impede the integration and 
capability transfer because of so-called “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema et al., 1996), with one layer 
arising from difficulties at the organizational culture level and the other at the national culture level. Acquirer 
and target have to combine both levels of cultural differences. In addition, as Siegel et al. (2011) suggest, as 
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cultural distance increases, target-firm stakeholders may become more difficult to deal with, subsidiary 
management becomes harder to monitor, and negotiations become more complex and costlier, ultimately 
giving rise to a risk of the deal being abandoned altogether. We therefore argue that “double-layered 
acculturation” can actually increase acquirer risk in cross-border M&As. The outer layer of country-level 
differences amplifies the risk generated by the inner layer of organization-level differences. Thus, we expect 
that cultural distance between the acquirer and the target at the country level will increase the acquirer’s risk 
in international M&As.  
 




Country governance is defined as the tradition and institutions by which authority is exercised (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2011). The difference in country governance (i.e., institutional distance) between the acquirer 
and the target is the key driver behind the “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, institutional 
distance is a critical factor for cross-border M&A performance. Scholars have examined its influences on 
the acquirer’s abnormal returns (Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2017; 
Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010), deal completion or abandonment (Dikova, Sahib, & Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016), and target premiums (Bris & Cabolis, 2008; Weitzel & 
Berns, 2006). Kwok and Reeb (2000), propose an upstream-downstream hypothesis, which states that 
MNEs going upstream (i.e., internationalizing into a more institutionally developed economy) experience a 
risk reduction, but those going downstream (i.e., internationalizing into a less institutionally developed 
economy) experience a risk increase. Upstream institutions provide more economic and political stability, 
which decreases the acquirer’s currency and governance risk. Also, in an upstream environment, assets and 
investments are easier for the acquirer to expropriate and exploit, which decreases its financial risk.  
More recent work supports country governance being portable in M&As (Bris, Brisley, & Cabolis, 
2008; Chari et al., 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2017), such that MNEs acquiring 
downstream targets can transfer their relatively better governance, thus facilitating resource redeployment, 
exploration, and diversification of their strategic assets. By sharing and transferring, the acquirer can 
improve the target’s value by controlling its corporate governance practices in its accounting, legal 
regulations, operational process etc. Therefore, acquiring downstream targets may ultimately decrease 
acquirers’ risk.  
Drawing from Kwok and Reeb (2000) above, but also acknowledging the portability of country 
governance, we therefore posit that: 
 
H3: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a downstream target’s country decreases the acquirer’s 
risk in cross-border M&As.  
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H4: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an upstream target’s country decreases the acquirer’s 
risk in cross-border M&As. 
 
Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance 
With increasing M&A activities, international acquirers have prior awareness of the cultural distance of a 
target’s nation and its potential influences on negotiation and integration (Chakrabarti et al., 2009). The 
awareness of information asymmetry due to cultural distance outstrips neglect or overconfidence coming 
from industry relatedness. Acquirers will likely engage more thoroughly with ex-ante M&A procedures such 
as screening, selection, evaluation, due diligence, and contracting. In other words, when acquiring a 
culturally distant target, the bidder will assume similarly high levels of information asymmetry for related as 
for unrelated targets. In the same vein, during the ex-post integration phase, acquirers – conscious of the 
cultural differences – will be better prepared for potential obstacles. This preparation will make the acquirers 
less likely to underestimate the implementation costs and potential hurdles in integrations with related 
targets when the firms are culturally disparate (Chakrabarti et al., 2009). Therefore, while acquirers may 
underestimate integration and consolidation costs in related acquisitions (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), the 
presence of high cultural distance will incite more rigorous ex-ante and ex-post M&A procedures, which will 
offset any overlooked aspects due to industry relatedness. Therefore, we propose that cultural distance will 
facilitate the operational synergy stemming from industry relatedness, and thus the interaction between 
cultural distance and industry relatedness will reduce the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As. In other 
words:  
 
H5: The higher the cultural distance between the acquirer’s and the target’s nations, the lower is the effect of industry 
relatedness on the acquirer’s shift in risk. 
 
Industry Relatedness and Institutional Distance 
In the context of cross-border M&As, as we argued above, the risks of moral hazard and information 
asymmetry are heightened, especially when the acquisition target is in a related industry. However, high 
institutional distance may allow the acquirer to experience a risk reduction either by allowing more 
autonomy to the target, or simply by taking advantage of the reduced sensitivity to market shocks. 
The more related a target is to the bidder, the more likely corporate managers are to reinforce 
consolidation efforts, rather than execute autonomous management within the subsidiary (Lubatkin & 
O’Neill, 1987). This can increase integration efforts and lead to losses associated with deal implementation 
risk (i.e. employee turnover, litigation, etc.). In fact, Salomon and Wu (2012, p. 344) suggest that “Foreign 
firms from more institutionally distant home countries are more likely to adopt local isomorphism strategies 
to acquire legitimacy and mitigate the liability of foreignness.” As such – particularly for related deals – in 
cases of high institutional distance acquirers are more likely to allow organizational autonomy to the target 
in order to better adopt the host country’s institutions and norms. This will in turn not only better help 
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acquirers to reduce risks associated with legitimacy costs, but also ultimately facilitate integration and 
mitigate the implementation uncertainties described above. In other words, while for domestic deals quick 
and effective integration can shield acquirers from risks associated with diseconomies of scale, in the 
presence of institutional distance bidders will not rush to impose an integration mandate unless it is 
reasonably safe and prudent to do so.  
In addition, despite the stylized fact in international finance that countries exhibit high stock market 
integration or interdependence (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Lee, 2006), institutional distance has been found 
to reduce market co-movement. Specifically, across global markets, the development of similar principal 
institutions (e.g., political and legal systems) increases the co-movement of stock returns, while institutional 
distance decreases it (Tavares, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that institutional distance, by reducing 
market interdependence between the acquirer and target countries, can also act as a “cushion” to industry-
specific shocks (i.e. from regulatory shifts, supply and labor shortages, etc), thereby mitigating the acquirer’s 
sensitivity to home-host market uncertainties.  
Therefore, institutional distance can act as a risk mitigation device for related acquisitions from 
both downstream and upstream countries; however, since the magnitude of the effects for the downstream 
and upstream countries may differ, we make two distinct hypotheses:  
 
H6: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a downstream target’s country, the lower 
is the effect of industry relatedness on the acquirer’s shift in risk.  
H7: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an upstream target’s country, the lower 
is the effect of industry relatedness on the acquirer’s shift in risk. 
 
Cultural Distance and Institutional Distance 
Culture is embedded in organizational structures and management styles (Schneider, 1990). Thus, with 
awareness of potential integration problems, the acquirer is expected to possess a diverse set of routines 
and repertoires as a result of acquiring culturally distant targets (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Such 
diversity increases the acquirer’s innovation and thus competitiveness in the long run. Nevertheless, since 
cultural values guide managers’ decision-making towards risk and return (Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2013; 
March & Shapira, 1987), diversity in managerial risk-taking and opportunity recognition might also be 
affected. What may be perceived as risk by managers in the acquirer’s country might be treated as 
opportunity in the target’s.  
With culturally different targets, acquirers are hence able to diversify their portfolio of managerial 
risk-taking. After all, subsidiaries and headquarters enjoy different standards and levels of risk and 
opportunity assessment, which drives diverse investment opportunities and uncorrelated operating 
earnings. Thus, by acquiring culturally distant targets, acquirers will build stronger internal resilience against 
market uncertainty. In addition, like institutional distance, cultural distance has been reported to result in 
lower levels of market co-movement (Lucey & Zhang, 2010). Thus, with both institutional distance and 
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cultural distance, acquirers can not only strengthen their internal resilience, but also reduce their sensitivity 
to market-level shocks, ultimately reducing their combined systematic risk.  
Following Kwok and Reeb (2000), acquirers of upstream targets (where the acquirer’s institutional 
environment is less developed than the target’s) have a better ability to arbitrage markets and leverage their 
capabilities towards reducing risk. On the other hand, acquirers of downstream targets (acquirer’s 
institutional environment is more developed than the target’s) enjoy the portability of corporate governance 
and improve their targets’ capabilities at resource exploitation, which also decreases their exposure to 
regulatory and environmental uncertainties. We therefore posit that, in the presence of high institutional 
distance (from either downstream or upstream markets), acquiring a culturally distant target will mitigate 
the acquirer’s risk; however, as in H3 and H4 above, we appreciate that the effects of downstream and 
upstream distance may differ in magnitude, so we put forward two distinct hypotheses:   
 
H8: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a downstream target’s country, the lower 
is the effect of cultural distance on the acquirer’s shift in risk. 
H9: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an upstream target’s country, the lower 
is the effect of cultural distance on the acquirer’s shift in risk.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The Sample of Cross-border M&As 
We collected data on US acquirers and foreign targets in completed deals from Thomson EIKON Deals 
(formerly Thomson One - SDC), combining it with archival accounting data from Compustat and share 
price data from CRSP. To include a merger in our sample, we employed a number of criteria in line with 
the majority of the relevant empirical studies. Our original sample included all completed deals during the 
period 2000-2014, where the acquirer was a US firm listed on one of the three main US exchanges (i.e. New 
York Stock Exchange; NASDAQ; AMEX) and the target was a non-US firm, either public or private. The 
size of the deal had to exceed $1 million with a minimum of a 5% stake sought by the acquirer during the 
deal. To ensure that the voting and cash flow rights in the target company were transferred to the 
shareholders of the acquirer, acquisitions of associates and minority stakes were also excluded from the 
analysis, and the acquirer’s stake in the target company after deal completion had to exceed 50%. Broadly, 
these baseline parameters ensured that only significant and representative takeover deals would be included 
in the sample, while the exchange of small (minority) stakes and any similar over-the-counter transactions 
would be excluded. In addition to the above, sufficient, reliable, and accurate data for a number of essential 
accounting variables had to be available from Compustat and CRSP. These screening criteria and this 
procedure resulted in a sample of 1,893 cross-border deals for which we were able to collect data on all of 
the necessary variables. 
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Dependent Variable and Model Specification 
With respect to measuring cross-border M&A risk, Lee and Caves (1998) suggest three alternatives: the 
variance of profits, the variance of abnormal stock market returns, and the turnover of a foreign subsidiary 
through shutdown and divestiture. Based on detailed comparisons and high correlations among these three 
measures (Lee & Caves, 1998), we measure M&A risk by stock market volatility using Carhart’s Four-Factor 
Model (1997).  
In modern portfolio theory, risk comprises two main components, namely systematic risk, broadly 
defined as a firm’s returns sensitivity to market returns, and unsystematic (or idiosyncratic) risk, which is the 
uncertainty specific to particular assets or firms. While unsystematic risk is inherent to a specific firm or 
industry, due to various unexpected factors – such as a new market entrant, regulatory shifts, shortages in 
labor, parts, etc. – systematic risk arises from market-wide shocks – such as changes in GDP, inflation, 
interest rates, government policies, or even acts of nature – which introduce uncertainty across all market 
participants. In asset pricing, investors – and by extension firms – can diversify away the unsystematic 
component of risk (i.e. firm-specific risk) by holding a broad range of asset classes, which cancel each other 
out. However, since the exposure of a portfolio to the entire market cannot be mitigated through 
diversification, systematic risk remains the component with the most relevance for firms and investors. As 
cross-border acquisitions can utilize differences across international markets, they are devices firms may be 
able to use to lower their systematic risk. Therefore, systematic risk is a particularly relevant measure of risk 
for our analysis.  
While standard event study methodologies normally estimate the information content of M&A 
announcements and other news, by means of abnormal returns, using some variant of the market model 
benchmark, we take a different approach. Unlike ordinary events that mainly influence cash flows – and 
whose information content can be estimated by a standard event study – a merger causes changes in both 
the risk and returns of individual securities. As a matter of fact, Brown, Harlow, & Tinic (1988) showed 
that many events cause the variance of returns to shift due to a temporary (or permanent) shift in systematic 
risk, so that the use of common methods may fail (Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen, 1991). If the news 
about the merger impacts on a firm’s systematic risk, on top of any future cash flows, benchmark parameters 
(factor loadings) estimated unconditionally during the estimation period (pre M&A announcement) will be 
biased and unable to be employed in the event window (post M&A announcement), since the betas may 
have shifted. Most event studies use pre-announcement benchmark parameters to estimate post-
announcement returns, while our aim is to actually model possible shifts in risk. Therefore, following 
MacKinlay (1997), to address whether an event impacts on risk we need to formulate the market model to 
allow betas to change over the event.  
In modeling the share price returns of cross-border acquirers, we opt for the Carhart Four-Factor 
Model. While the majority of the literature has examined similar events using residuals from single-factor 
asset pricing models, such as the market model or the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), multifactor 
models have been reported to explain more variation in the cross-section of average stock returns (over 
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95% compared to 70% on average by the CAPM). Fama and French (1993), particularly, point out that 
residuals from three-factor regressions will do a better job in isolating the firm-specific components of 
returns in event studies of the stock-price response to firm-specific information. A multifactor model is 
therefore more apt for the purposes of our study. 
Using daily share price returns data from CRSP, we first calculate Total Risk as the total variability 
in a security’s returns (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s returns 
after accounting for the risk-free rate, σ(R#$ −	R'$). Thus, we calculate the standard deviation of the daily 
returns for each acquirer six months (120 trading days) before and six months after a cross-border M&A 
announcement as follows:	)*(+, )) = .∑ (0102)3(415) .  
To estimate the acquirer’s systematic risk before and after each announcement we use the Carhart 
Four-Factor Model:  
*67 −	*87 = 967 + ;<6=*> − *8?7 + ;@6ABC+	;D6EBF7 + ;G6HBI7 + J67 (1) 
where *67 −	*87 	is the excess return of firm i minus the one-month T-bill (risk-free) return at time t. In 
the Carhart Four-Factor Model, α67 is the risk-adjusted abnormal return of firm i; =*> − *8?7 	is the 
difference between the daily NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted market portfolio returns and the 
risk-free return; high minus low (HML) is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-
to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks; small minus big (SMB) is the difference 
between the returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small-
firm risk; up minus down (UMD) is the return on a zero-cost portfolio that is long previous return winners 
and short previous loser stocks, which controls for momentum, the empirically observed tendency for rising 
asset prices to rise further and falling prices to keep falling. Therefore, the four risk parameter coefficients 
(factor loadings) ;<1G6 jointly represent the systematic risk of the firm.  
Having estimated risk parameters for every firm in our sample during both periods, before and 
after the merger announcement, we proceed to calculate Systematic Risk E*(+, ))for each period, by 
adjusting Total Risk )*(+, )) using the coefficient of determination (R2) of eq. 1 above as follows:  
E*(+, )) = L)*(+, ))@ ∙ *@(+, )) (2) 
Finally, we calculate the annualized systematic risk for the two periods as 
NOOE*(+, )) = E*(+, )) ∙ √252 (3) 
and our dependent variable (∆Risk) is the difference in the annualized systematic risk of the acquirer’s stock 
returns during the 120 trading days after the acquisition announcement and that during the 120 trading days 
prior to the announcement:  
S*TUV6 =	NOOE*6(W,<@W) − NOOE*6(1<@W,1<)NOOE*6(1<@W,1<)  (4) 
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A positive value of ∆Risk indicates an increase in the systematic risk for the acquirer and a negative 
one suggests a decrease in the risk. To explain the variation in the post-acquisition changes in the acquirers’ 
risk and directly test our study hypotheses, we employ the following general equation: 
S*TUV6 = ;W + ;<X*6 + ;@YI6 + ;DXIZ6 + ;GXI[6 + ;\X*6 × YI6
+ ;^X*6 × XIZ6 + ;_X*6 × XI[6 + ;`YI6 × XIZ6
+ ;aYI6 × XI[6 + ;<Wb6 + ;<<c6 + J6 
(5) 
where X*6 	is Industry Relatedness for each deal (i) in the sample, YI6 is the Cultural Distance between the 
acquirer’s (US) and the target’s nation, XIZ6 and XI[6 is the Institutional Distance for downstream and 
upstream deals respectively, b6 denotes a set of control variables known to influence systematic risk, and 
c6 is a set of year fixed effects.  
 
Independent Variables 
We measure Industry Relatedness (IR) as a dummy variable, which equals one if the acquirer and the target 
share the same primary four-digit SIC industry code and zero otherwise. We calculate Cultural Distance (CD) 
based on Hofstede’s (2001) four cultural dimensions, using the composite measure from Zhou et al. (2016). 
Specifically, for each M&A deal in our dataset we compute the cultural distance as d∑ (Ee,6 − Ef,6)@G6g< h/4, 
where Ee,6 and Ef,6 denote the cultural scores of the target and home (US) countries respectively. Kaufmann 
et al. (2011) measure country governance quality using World Governance Indicators (published by the 
World Bank) on control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and voice and accountability. Following Ellis et al. (2017), we measure Institutional Distance (ID) as 
the averaged differences between the target country’s and the US’s scores on each dimension. We categorize 
ID into Downstream Institutional Distance (IDD) when ID is negative and into Upstream Institutional Distance (IDU) 
when ID is positive.  
 
Control Variables 
To control for pre-acquisition risk-magnitude effects and also to calibrate our sample to the “regular” levels 
of systematic risk for each firm, we control for NOOE*(1<@W,1<), the acquirer’s pre-M&A annualized risk 
during the six months prior to the announcement. We also expect the broader economic conditions and 
the mergers market to play a significant role in forming the acquirers’ post-merger risk reactions. Hence, 
we first employ the dummy variable Recession, which takes the value one for deals that took place during the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. Along the same lines, as merger waves are identified 
as a key driver of takeover activity in the M&A literature, we use the dummy variable Merger wave, which 
takes the value of one for deals that took place during 2003-2008 (the 6th wave) and after 2012 (the still 
ongoing 7th wave) and zero otherwise. Following Han (2007), we also control for changes in the CBOE 
Volatility Index (VIX), which represents the average implied volatility of the at-the-money index options 
30 days before expiration and is therefore a valid proxy for the instantaneous volatility of the S&P 500 
-15- 
index. To proxy for market sentiment, we employ the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) 
sentiment measure, deriving from a weekly (every Thursday) survey of individual investors, where responses 
are classified as bullish, bearish, or neutral. Following Fisher and Statman (2006) and Kurov (2008), we 
compute an investor sentiment index as the number of bullish investors expressed as a percentage of the 
number of bullish plus bearish investors. We match both variables, ∆VIX and ∆Sentiment, to the event 
window of our dependent variable. ∆VIX is therefore measured as the difference in VIX and ∆Sentiment as 
the difference in the mean AAII sentiment, between 120 trading days after and 120 trading days prior to 
the announcement. 
We also control for deal-level variables that might confound our dependent variable. We control 
for the percentage of the deal value paid in Cash, since stock payments can reduce the information 
asymmetry by linking the payment to the target performance, while cash payments indicate confidence on 
the part of the acquirer about the deal. We also control for Relative Deal Size, the ratio of the total amount 
paid to the target, to the acquirer’s market value at the year-end prior to the deal. In addition, the Percent of 
Shares Acquired indicates the level of control the acquirer has over the target, which predicts the return and 
risk the acquirer shares with the target. Firm-level variables expected to influence our dependent variable 
are the acquirer’s Price/Book Ratio and Leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets). The Price/Book Ratio is 
used to control for whether the acquirer’s stock is undervalued or overvalued, while leverage is an important 
financial ratio predicting financial distress and failure (Beaver, 1966).  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by various groups. It is important to note that cross-
border M&As, on average, generate a 0.18 (18%) significant increase in risk. Panel A presents the sample 
distribution across target nations. The UK and Canada are the top two target nations for US acquirers, 
making up 20% and 16% of our sample, respectively. In addition, on average, the most significant risk 
increase comes from deals targeted in India, Italy, and Israel. While India, Italy, and Israel are the countries 
showing the greatest risk increase, they share different levels of cultural distance and/or institutional 
distance with the US. For example, India is very different in culture and institutions from the US, while 
Italy is more similar to the US in both respects. However, the deals targeted in both India and Italy show 
the largest increases in post-acquisition risk. Thus, preliminarily, cultural distance and institutional distance 
cannot fully explain the increase in the acquirer’s risk. In the countries at a high cultural distance from the 
US, we also see a worse institutional environment than that of the US (e.g., Mexico has a score of 20.54 for 
cultural distance and one of -1.39 for institutional distance). Panel B shows the distribution of the sample 
by acquirer’s industry. The business services and electronic equipment industries account for the largest 
percentages, at 21.1% and 12% of our sample. Pharmaceutical products, petroleum and natural gas, and 
precious metals respectively make 50.7%, 54.3%, and 64% related acquisitions, while banking acquirers 
make no related acquisitions. We cannot obtain a clear picture of the relationship between related 
acquisitions and the risk increase from Panel B. We distribute our sample by year in Panel C. The year 2008 
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sees a significant post-announcement risk increase of 0.64, while 2009 shows a significant risk decrease of 
-0.30, mainly attributable to the financial crisis. US cross-border acquirers in our sample also experienced 
significant risk increases in 2000 and 2002, and a significant risk decrease in 2012.  
 
------Insert Table 1 here----- 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all variables. The mean 
value of Industry Relatedness is 0.31, indicating that we have more unrelated than related acquisitions in our 
sample. The mean of Absolute Institutional Distance is 0.481, and that of the indicator for Upstream deals is 
0.67, which shows that US companies in our sample predominately acquire targets in upstream countries 
(UK, Canada, Germany, Australia), as is also shown in Table 1. Most of the deals are paid for in cash 
(93.32%) and US acquirers, on average, pursue a large, controlling stake (86.49%). Cross-correlations in the 
table are as expected and do not raise much concern about collinearity. It is noteworthy that Cultural Distance 
and our Upstream deals indicator present a relatively high negative correlation (-0.74), suggesting that target 
countries at a high cultural distance from the US in general present a poorer institutional environment. As 
Ahern et al. (2015) point out, national institutions are very likely interrelated with culture, such that cultural 
and institutional distances can be jointly and endogenously determined. While it is not the purpose of our 
study to make causal inferences between the two, high correlations across explanatory variables raise 
collinearity concerns. To address such concerns, care was taken to ensure that, in all econometric 
specifications, highly related terms were mean-centered and carefully combined. The splitting of our 
institutional distance measure into upstream and downstream measures (Kwok & Reeb, 2000) and the 
subsequent mean-centering of all distance scores was applied to help reduce first-order correlations to 
acceptable levels, while variance inflation factors (VIFs) were used to detect multicollinearity.  
 
------ Insert Table 2 here ------ 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results of the multivariate regression models are presented in Table 3. In the first column, the base 
model shows the coefficient estimates for the benchmark specification with an intercept and all control 
variables, for ∆Risk as the dependent variable. In column 2, the main effects model includes the direct 
effects from the independent variables (IR, CD, IDD and IDU), including all controls and year fixed effects. 
In column 3, in the model labelled IR Í CD, we add the interaction term between Industry Relatedness and 
Cultural Distance. The model named IR Í ID (column 4) presents the main effects plus two separate 
interaction terms between Industry Relatedness and Downstream Institutional Distance, and Industry Relatedness and 
Upstream Institutional Distance. Finally, in column 5, the model denoted by CD Í ID shows the results for 
all main effects plus the two interaction terms between Downstream Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance 
and between Upstream Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance.  
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------ Insert Table 3 here ------ 
 
 Several of our controls show significant effects on the acquirer’s risk change. Not surprisingly, pre-
M&A Risk (T-120, T-1) has a negative relationship with ∆Risk, and acts as an effective control for the 
magnitude of the pre-acquisition (baseline) risk. Therefore, in the presence of this control, the remaining 
variance in ∆Risk is net of confounding or scaling properties. ∆VIX has a positive coefficient, suggesting 
that market volatility also amplifies an acquirer’s shift in systematic risk in our sample. Meanwhile, 
∆Sentiment has a negative effect on ∆Risk, such that a generally bullish market sentiment reduces market 
risk. These controls confirm the validity of our dependent variable. It is noteworthy that, while the effect 
of Merger Wave is negative, the Recession dummy does not capture any of the acquirer’s risk change, despite 
the fact that, in Table 1 (Panel C), ∆Risk appears to spike around the recession period. We attribute this to 
the rather crude nature of the indicator variables, which span several years and thus do not capture the 
intricacies that single-year dummies would. In the subsequent estimations, we include year fixed effects to 
remedy this. According to the positive coefficient of Relative Deal Size, the acquirer’s risk also increases post 
acquisition if the target size is large.  
 The two deal-level factors other than the relative deal size (percentage paid in cash and percentage 
of shares acquired) are not significant. The reason might be that these two variables do not present much 
variability in our sample of cross-border M&As. Apparently, cross-border US acquirers, at least in our 
sample, generally prefer full cash as the payment method (the mean and median of cash payment percentage 
are 93.32% and 100% as seen in Table 2) and they tend to fully acquire the target firm (the mean and median 
of percentage of shares acquired are 86.49% and 100%). Both firm-level controls, Price/Book Ratio and 
Leverage, are not significant.  
 The model of main effects shows that the effect of Industry Relatedness (IR) is positive and significant 
(β1 = 0.050, p<0.01), offering support to Hypothesis H1. As Industry Relatedness is a dummy variable, the 
coefficient of 0.05, suggests a 5% ceteris paribus increase in annualized risk for non-diversifying acquisitions, 
a value which is also economically significant. Therefore, contrary to Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987), who 
found relatedness to decrease risk in domestic acquisitions, we show that, in a cross-border context, 
relatedness (on its own) has a rather adverse effect on risk. Meanwhile, Cultural Distance (CD) and Institutional 
Distance (ID) do not appear – at least directly – to influence risk changes. The coefficient of cultural distance 
on the acquirer’s risk change is nearly zero and insignificant, showing that cultural distance at a country 
level does not appear to further amplify the increased risk stemming from cultural difference at an 
organizational level. Whether the nature of the effect of the two layers of “double-layered acculturation” is 
supplementary or complementary would be a rather interesting item for future investigations. Institutional 
distance both downstream and upstream decrease the acquirer’s post-acquisition risk, but the effects are 
not significant. One explanation could be that country-level uncertainties alone do not necessarily pose 
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difficulties or generate opportunities for acquirers. Acquirers need to exploit the integration effect between 
external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) risk factors to achieve a reduction in risk.   
 With the introduction of the first interaction term (model 3: IR Í CD) into our model, after grand-
mean-centering CD, the results of the main factors do not change, while the interaction term (IR Í CD) 
has a negative effect on the risk change (β5 = -0.01, p<0.01), in support of H5. Thus, in cross-border M&As, 
relatedness and cultural distance complement each other in producing a risk reduction. As Figure 1 also 
illustrates, acquirers can best mitigate cross-border acquisition risks when they bid for related targets from 
culturally distant countries or unrelated targets from culturally proximate countries. In line with the 
integrated risk management perspective, the results support that the sources of risk behind the two layers 
of “double-layered acculturation” can simultaneously balance off against each other, reducing overall post-
acquisition risk. 
 
------ Insert Figure 1 here ------ 
 
In column 4 of Table 3 (model IR x ID), the results support that US acquirers can mitigate their 
risk from related acquisitions by bidding for institutionally distant targets from either downstream (β6 = -
0.177, p<0.01) or upstream (β7 = -0.401, p<0.05) countries. Therefore, H6 and H7 are both supported, 
while – also in line with our expectations – the effects on the upstream and downstream sides differ in 
magnitude. Since the effect size of Upstream is around three times bigger than that of Downstream, acquirers 
enjoy the greatest risk reduction by acquiring related targets from upstream countries with higher 
institutional distance. Thus, the “liability of foreignness” can act as an effective risk mitigation scenario for 
related acquisitions, as is also shown in Figure 2.   
 
------ Insert Figure 2 here ------ 
 
Finally, the results in column 5 (model ID x CD) support that bidders experience systematic risk 
declines when the targets are from upstream countries (β9 = -0.041, p<0.1), in support of H9. However, it 
appears that, for downstream targets, no combination of cultural and institutional distance distinctly 
influences post-acquisition risk, as we can also see from the interaction plots in Figure 3. Therefore, H8 is 
not supported. It can be argued that downstream institutions have more volatile business environments, 
higher customer risks, and political uncertainties, which firms from upstream countries are not always 
equipped to address (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). Since the “liability of foreignness” coming from downstream 
institutions cannot be mitigated by “double-layered acculturation”, firms may be better off engaging 
alternative internal mechanisms, such as the ones suggested by the governance literature, i.e., contingent 
payouts (Reuer et al., 2004). For all the estimated models in Table 3, we also report mean VIFs. Since the 
mean VIFs do not exceed 2 in any of the models, we are confident that collinearity is not an issue.  
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------ Insert Figure 3 here ------ 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In Table 4, we illustrate the results from six sets of robustness checks.  
First, we use an alternative measure of institutional distance. Instead of the six dimensions from 
the World Governance Indicators we employ scores from the Fraser Institute’s World Economic Freedom 
Index (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; North, 1990; Zhou et al., 2016). The index is a scalar variable ranging from 1 
(low level of institutional development) to 10 (high level of institutional development). For each deal in our 
sample, we calculate the difference in the scores for the target’s and the acquirer’s country as EFI distance. 
The results are quite robust (columns 1-3) and while support for H1 is weak, the key risk mitigation 
hypotheses (H5, H6, H8, and H9) are supported.  
Second, we use Altman Z-scores (Altman, 1968) as an alternative approach to cross-border 
acquirer risk. Altman’s Z-score – widely used as a risk measure across finance and accounting – indicates a 
firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy (Agarwal & Taffler, 2007; Reynolds & Francis, 2000) and is estimated as 
 Z	 = 	1.2X< 	+ 	1.4X@ 	+ 	3.3XD 	+ 	0.6XG 	+ 	1.0X\ (3) 
where  X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt 
X5 = Sales / Total Assets 
For each acquirer in our sample, we first calculate Z-scores one year prior to the announcement 
(Y-1) and one year after the announcement (Y+1), and then employ the difference between these scores ΔZ 
(Y-1,Y+1) as a new dependent variable in eq. 5. The mean (median) pre-acquisition Z-score is 4.013 (3.454) 
and the mean (median) change ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) is -0.641 (-0.220). Since a lower Z-score suggests a higher 
likelihood of bankruptcy, the negative values of ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) are perfectly in line with the general increases 
in ΔRisk, the change in the annualized systematic risk of the acquirer’s stock returns around the M&A 
announcement, as observed in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in columns 4-6 show that, while the main 
effects hypotheses (H1-H4) are not supported, coefficients ;\, ;^, ;_, and ;`	are positive and significant 
(at least at 10%), suggesting that combinations of external uncertainties can indeed moderate acquirers’ 
post-merger risk and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
The third set of robustness checks involves limiting our original sample to serial acquirers (i.e., 
acquirers that had completed at least one cross-border M&A already), to test the consistency of the 
empirical results for experienced acquirers. The results on the remaining 1,099 deals, shown under columns 
7-9, offer support to H5, H6, and H9, suggesting that the integrated risk perspective generally holds for 
serial/experienced acquirers.  
Furthermore, in line with common practice in the M&A empirical literature, we exclude 
acquisitions by banks, insurance companies, and financial firms (Fama-French Industry Group 17: Banks, 
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Insurance Companies, and Other Financials). Financials usually present increased leverage and particular 
risk characteristics (Fama & French, 1992), while they are also often subject to complex domestic and 
international regulatory backdrops. To ensure that such skewed financial fundamentals and external 
influences do not drive our results, we exclude 122 deals from our original sample. In columns 10-12, where 
we re-estimate the full model from eq. 5, the majority of our hypotheses (H1, H5, H6, H7, and H9) are 
supported for the remaining 1,771 cross-border acquisitions in our sample. 
Finally, given the noteworthy concentration of cross-border targets in the UK (369) and Canada 
(298), we deemed it necessary to eliminate the possibility that the empirical results were driven by the 
dominance of these major target markets. As both these target countries present better institutional 
development than the US (positive institutional distance), there is a risk that H7 (IR Í DU) and H9 (CD Í 
IDU) in particular – which predict that risks from industry relatedness and cultural distance can be mitigated 
by upstream institutional distance – may no longer hold once these countries are excluded from the analysis. 
In columns 13-15, where we omit UK deals, although H1 and H7 are rejected, the key hypotheses H5, H6, 
and H9 are still supported. These results suggest that, while in the absence of UK deals certain effects are 
weaker, the integrated risk approach remains an effective risk mitigation mechanism for all other target 
countries. In columns 16-18, we exclude the Canadian target deals and all results are qualitatively identical 
to those of the full sample in Table 3.  
------ Insert Table 4 here ------ 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this article, we address a gap in the IB literature by investigating the risk side of performance in a cross-
border M&A context. We find that the systematic risk of US acquirers of foreign firms rises by about 18% 
on average during the post-acquisition period. Building on Miller (1992), we theorize and test the integrated 
risk management perspective in the domain of international M&As. Specifically, we exploit the 
simultaneous trade-offs among the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard, “double-layered 
acculturation”, and the “liability of foreignness”.  
Information asymmetry is a fundamental factor leading to the risk of adverse selection. Industry 
relatedness should decrease the risk of adverse selection, since the acquirer is familiar with the target’s 
business. Nonetheless, acquirers of related targets aim to achieve operational synergies, and are thus likely 
to attempt a large degree of consolidation. In an international context, high integration and implementation 
costs do not enable acquirers to realize operational synergy, especially when they become overconfident 
about their knowledge of the target and underestimate the challenges; the hubris, driven up by related 
acquisitions, therefore leads to risk increases for international acquirers. 
In cross-border M&As, external factors, such as “double-layered acculturation” and the “liability 
of foreignness” further intensify acquirers’ risk by exacerbating and complicating the above internal factors 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Nonetheless, our results support that external uncertainties, if 
configured suitably with internal ones, can mitigate acquirers’ risk in international M&As. With cultural 
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awareness, acquirers can leverage high cultural distance to control industry-relatedness risks. After 
extending the upstream-downstream hypothesis of Kwok and Reeb (2000) to also account for the direction 
and magnitude of institutional distance, we find that firms do not necessarily expose themselves to more 
risk when they engage in acquisitions of downstream targets. However, institutional distance, as the key 
driver behind “liability of foreignness”, can mitigate acquirers’ risk from related acquisitions; thus, external 
uncertainty can mitigate acquirers’ risk stemming from internal factors. In addition, we show that –
irrespective of target relatedness- upstream acquirers can further mitigate post acquisition risks by 
internationalizing into culturally distant countries. However, at least from a risk management perspective, 
we do not find benefits to downstream acquirers who internationalize into countries with both high cultural 
and institutional distance.   
Our results strengthen Miller’s (1992) integrated risk management perspective of IB and offer 
strong support for the notion that risk factors are interactive and cannot be managed alone. As we show, 
acquirers’ cross-border risk is an outcome of complementary and competing effects from such factors as 
adverse selection, moral hazard problems, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Therefore, our results 
complement existing research in IB (i.e. Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987) and international finance (Ahern et al., 
2015; Siegel et al., 2011), which examine the influences of cultural and institutional distance in isolation of 
internal uncertainties.  
 One limitation of our study is our use of a sample of US acquirers only. In our study, both cultural 
and institutional distance are measured against the US. This may limit the applicability of integrated risk 
management to US acquirers. Future research could examine the research questions in a global M&A 
context where acquirers are from multiple countries. Furthermore, although our sector-based proxy for 
industry relatedness is in line with the vast majority of the extant M&A empirical research, it may not 
completely capture the degree of organizational similarity in business traits and goals. To fully measure how 
acquirers and targets share strategic interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating level, 
we would need primary proprietary data from internal firm sources, which are not widely available. Further 
research might focus on developing reliable and precise proxies for operational similarity.  
 Our study opens several important avenues for future research. First, future research could 
investigate the application of integrated risk management in the context of other internationalization 
strategies (e.g., international joint ventures) or with other types of uncertainties (e.g., political risk). Miller 
(1992) suggests a variety of levels of uncertainties firms face when internationalizing, thus offering a very 
solid foundation for future studies. Second, we open a research stream focused on studying and quantifying 
strategic international risks. With the volatile global environment, as well as the drastic development of 
technology, risk mitigation plays an increasingly critical role in firms’ internationalization. Our measure of 
risk offers a sound empirical foundation for a more holistic examination of firms’ strategic international 
risks. Third, in this paper we focus on industry relatedness as the primary indicator of firm-level differences. 
Future research could examine the effects of the inner layer of “double-layered acculturation” (i.e. 
organizational-level cultural distance) to proxy for information asymmetry and moral hazard. Lastly, with 
-22- 
the help of our theoretical extensions and empirical approach, future research may study the aptness of the 
integrated risk management perspective on international M&A failure. In other words, does the trade-off 
among diverse risk factors reduce the probability of cross-border M&A failure? If so, how can international 
acquirers manage those risk factors? 
 
MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE 
Our study provides practical implications for international acquirers, who can mitigate their overall 
risk by integrating various risk factors. To leverage their exposure to uncertainties such as information 
asymmetry, moral hazard, and country-level differences, acquirers can utilize the trade-offs across their 
respective indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. The simultaneous 
trade-offs across these indicators can provide acquirers with several scenarios for risk mitigation (see Table 
5 for a taxonomy and illustrations): in Scenario I, when an acquirer wishes to target a firm in a similar line 
of business (i.e. High IR), overall post-acquisition risk can be reduced if the target is in a culturally distant 
country (High CD). In Scenario II, overall acquirer risk also decreases if a similar target is from a country 
with a very different institutional environment (High ID), particularly a better one. On the other hand, 
when merging with or taking over a firm in a different industry, overall risk is mitigated when the target is 
from a proximate cultural (Scenario III) or institutional (Scenario IV) background. Therefore, when an 
acquirer increases their exposure to information asymmetry and moral hazard – by acquiring a target from 
a different industry – they should decrease their exposure to the “liability of foreignness” and “double-
layered acculturation” – by acquiring a target from a similar culture and institutional environment. Also, in 
Scenarios V and VI, when an acquirer wants to purchase a target from a foreign country in order to diversify 
their overall risk, it will be more rewarding to choose a target from a country which is both culturally and 
institutionally different. In other words, when aiming to diversify risk via overseas acquisitions, firms should 
seek to increase their exposure to both cultural and institutional uncertainties, especially when they come 
from countries with better institutions.  
Of course, not all uncertainty exposures should necessarily be eliminated, since risk-taking is an 
important element of the returns generation process in business. However, in scanning for cross-border 
M&A targets, the exploitation of trade-offs across the aforementioned uncertainties can provide acquirers 
with the advantage of risk mitigation before they have to invest in a sunk cost. In conclusion, we 
recommend that acquirers establish uncertainty exposure profiles for international M&As to help optimize 
their risk-adjusted returns. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Target Nation 






United Kingdom 369 3.22 0.16 0.16 *** 
Canada 298 3.76 0.31 0.24 *** 
Germany 152 7.82 0.18 0.17 *** 
France 109 14.02 -0.07 0.12 ** 
Australia 102 1.39 0.30 0.15 ** 
China 73 20.79 -1.81 0.23 ** 
Netherlands 62 12.44 0.41 0.12 * 
Israel 58 14.89 -0.73 0.24 ** 
India 52 14.34 -1.54 0.37 *** 
Sweden 45 15.85 0.47 0.08 
Switzerland 44 6.95 0.46 0.08 
Brazil 41 17.17 -1.30 0.07 
Japan 40 18.42 -0.18 0.15 
South Korea 39 22.05 -0.59 0.17 ** 
Spain 34 15.59 -0.33 0.13 
Italy 33 8.77 -0.66 0.24 ** 
Mexico 32 20.54 -1.39 0.18 
Norway 31 14.78 0.44 0.08 
Denmark 26 14.62 0.52 0.11 
Ireland-Rep 25 6.81 0.22 0.30 ** 
Other 228 16.72 -0.53 0.20 *** 




Panel B: Sample Distribution by Acquirer’s Industry 
Acquirer's Industry N % Related Target 
Mean  
Δ Risk 
Business Services 398 41.0% 0.20 *** 
Electronic Equipment 223 39.9% 0.09 *** 
Machinery 124 21.8% 0.21 *** 
Computers 104 9.6% 0.10 ** 
Medical Equipment 92 28.3% 0.02 
Measuring and Control Equipment 88 12.5% 0.09 * 
Trading 87 11.5% 0.40 *** 
Pharmaceutical Products 71 50.7% 0.34 *** 
Chemicals 68 27.9% 0.10 
Wholesale 49 22.4% 0.15 * 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 46 54.3% 0.17 * 
Electrical Equipment 43 14.0% 0.11 
Retail 43 27.9% 0.12 
Automobiles and Trucks 37 45.9% 0.26 ** 
Consumer Goods 34 32.4% 0.17 * 
Construction Materials 30 10.0% 0.26 ** 
Steel Works etc 28 21.4% 0.23 
Communication 28 25.0% 0.39 *** 
Banking 26 0.0% 0.11 
Precious Metals 25 64.0% 0.17 
Others 249 37.8% 0.21 *** 
Total - Grand Mean 1,893 31.6% 0.18 *** 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution by Year 





2000 205 41,385.20 44.06 0.33 *** 
2002 124 18,111.58 30.00 0.35 *** 
2003 119 35,985.33 28.00 -0.02 
2004 163 21,816.90 38.80 0.01 
2005 171 33,420.07 32.67 0.02 
2006 165 32,895.01 48.41 0.06 
2007 164 46,841.33 27.15 0.38 *** 
2008 141 36,315.04 36.80 0.64 *** 
2009 88 24,018.80 35.04 -0.30 *** 
2010 122 31,255.21 71.43 0.03 
2011 140 43,816.64 57.95 0.61 *** 
2012 140 48,374.15 59.72 -0.15 *** 
2013 121 29,108.87 72.00 0.10 ** 
2014 30 6,048.86 73.92 0.29 *** 
Total - Grand Mean 1,893 449,392.99 41.70 0.18 *** 




Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations  
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Δ Risk  1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Risk (T-120, T-1) -0.29*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Δ VIX Index (T0, T120) 0.59*** -0.17*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Δ AAII Sentiment (T0, T120) -0.11*** 0.03 -0.12*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Merger Wave Dummy -0.04* -0.21*** 0.05** -0.02 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
6. Recession Dummy 0.01 0.24*** 0.04* 0.10*** -0.38*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
7. % Paid in Cash 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
8. Price/Book Ratio -0.05** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
9. Total Debt/Total Assets 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.05** -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.11*** 0.12*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
10. Relative Deal Size 0.04* 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.18*** -0.10*** 0.04 1.00 . . . . . . 
11. % of Shares Acquired -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06** -0.02 -0.01 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.18*** 0.13*** 1.00 . . . . . 
12. Prior Acquisition Experience 0.01 0.01 0.05** -0.01 0.00 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.08*** 0.26*** -0.12*** -0.20*** 1.00 . . . . 
13. Industry Relatedness 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.06*** -0.04* 0.05** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.08*** 1.00 . . . 
14. Cultural Distance 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10*** -0.08*** -0.25*** 0.15*** 0.04 1.00 . . 
15. Absolute Inst. Distance 0.02 -0.06** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12*** -0.08*** -0.24*** 0.11*** 0.06** 0.59*** 1.00 . 
16. Upstream / Downstream -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04* 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.11*** 0.26*** -0.14*** -0.02 -0.74*** -0.62*** 1.00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
Mean 0.180 0.228 0.331 -0.005 0.750 0.185 93.322 3.126 0.496 0.079 86.497 2.269 0.316 9.870 0.481 0.671 
5th Percentile -0.534 0.076 -8.391 -0.137 0.000 0.000 47.945 0.732 0.151 0.000 10.522 0.000 0.000 1.392 0.054 0.000 
Median 0.035 0.192 -0.575 -0.002 1.000 0.000 100.000 2.309 0.490 0.022 100.00 1.000 0.000 7.818 0.321 1.000 
95th Percentile 1.496 0.494 11.599 0.118 1.000 1.000 100.000 7.888 0.900 0.322 100.00 9.000 1.000 22.050 1.744 1.000 
SD 0.622 0.141 6.621 0.078 0.433 0.389 18.268 3.176 0.215 0.184 28.370 4.845 0.465 6.711 0.497 0.470 
N 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 






IR Í CD 
(4) 
IR Í ID 
(5) 
CD Í ID 
Constant 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.487*** 0.473*** 0.478*** 
 (7.582) (6.534) (6.990) (6.582) (6.522)    
Risk (T-120, T-1) -0.941*** -1.313*** -1.326*** -1.316*** -1.317*** 
 (-6.293) (-10.738) (-10.667) (-10.870) (-10.511)    
Δ VIX 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (16.619) (16.313) (16.277) (16.157) (16.430)    
Δ Sentiment -0.357*** -0.295*** -0.288*** -0.297*** -0.293*** 
 (-3.970) (-3.339) (-3.146) (-3.240) (-3.308)    
Merger Wave Dummy -0.165*** . . . . 
 (-3.122)     
Recession Dummy 0.003 . . . . 
 (0.099)     
% Paid in Cash 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.430) (-0.387) (-0.516) (-0.357) (-0.345)    
Price/Book Ratio -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.190) (-0.427) (-0.595) (-0.571) (-0.324)    
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.071 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.017 
 (1.094) (0.359) (0.406) (0.353) (0.285)    
Relative Deal Size 0.188* 0.153 0.151 0.155 0.155 
 (1.788) (1.439) (1.432) (1.443) (1.459)    
% of Shares Acquired -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.053) (-0.450) (-0.427) (-0.362) (-0.358)    
Prior M&A Experience -0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.820) (0.598) (0.489) (0.576) (0.723)    
Industry Relatedness (IR)                    (H1) . 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.047**  
  (3.130) (3.233) (3.653) (2.830)    
Cultural Distance (CD)                       (H2) . -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.468) (1.355) (-0.371) (-0.443)    
Inst. Distance Downstream (IDD)      (H3) . -0.008 -0.004 0.050 0.026 
  (-0.326) (-0.177) (1.568) (0.433)    
Inst. Distance Upstream (IDU)           (H4) . -0.046 -0.062 0.087 -0.066 
  (-0.649) (-0.841) (1.165) (-0.944)    
IR Í CD                                                 (H5) . . -0.010*** . . 
   (-4.295)   
IR Í IDD                                              (H6) . . . -0.177*** . 
    (-2.998)  
IR Í IDU                                                (H7) . . . -0.401** . 
    (-2.401)  
CD Í IDD                                             (H8) . . . . -0.004 
     (-0.522)    
CD Í IDU                                             (H9) . . . . -0.041*   
     (-2.050)    
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
R-squared 0.408 0.452 0.454 0.455 0.453 
Adj. R-squared 0.404 0.447 0.449 0.450 0.448 
Mean VIF 1.116 1.174 1.230 1.269 1.801 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD), and Institutional Distance 
(ID) on Systematic Risk Changes (∆Risk) surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by industry are reported in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Robustness Tests 
DV: ΔRisk; ID: EFI DV: Δ Altman Z-Score Sample: Serial acquirers 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID 
Constant 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.096***  -1.269*** -1.188*** -1.256***  0.521*** 0.500*** 0.512*** 
IR (H1) 0.004 0.003 0.005  -0.092 -0.007 -0.094  0.031 0.028 0.020 
CD (H2) 0.000 0.000 -0.001**  -0.004 0.001 -0.001  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
IDD (H3) 0.007 0.017** 0.020***  0.214* 0.021 -0.133  0.025 0.084** 0.027 
IDU (H4) 0.012 0.014 -0.021  -0.535** -0.652* -0.545**  0.053 0.169 0.054 
IRÍCD (H5) -0.002** . .  0.015* . .  -0.010*** . . 
IRÍ IDD (H6) . -0.031*** .  . 0.511* .  . -0.215*** . 
IR ÍIDU (H7) . -0.015 .  . 1.718*** .  . -0.304 . 
CD Í IDD   (H8) . . -0.001**  . . 0.045*  . . 0.000 
CD Í IDU (H9) . . -0.009***  . . -0.022  . . -0.040*** 
Controls: Base Model ü ü ü  ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,535 1,535 1,535 1,099 1,099 1,099 
Adj. R-squared 0.533 0.534 0.533 0.126 0.075 0.126 0.488 0.489 0.486 
Mean VIF 1.337 1.403 1.860   1.254 1.298 1.811   1.289 1.320 1.815 
Sample: Excl. Financials  Sample: Excl. United Kingdom  Sample: Excl. Canada 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID IRÍCD IRÍID CDÍID 
Constant 0.475*** 0.459*** 0.463*** 0.515*** 0.505*** 0.500*** 0.454*** 0.439*** 0.450*** 
IR (H1) 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.051***  0.024 0.018 0.012  0.060*** 0.043*** 0.041** 
CD (H2) 0.004** 0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.002 -0.001  0.005* 0.001 0.000 
IDD (H3) -0.008 0.050 0.037  -0.001 0.053 0.021  -0.010 0.044 0.016 
IDU (H4) -0.071 0.056 -0.070  -0.124 -0.085 -0.052  -0.119 0.047 -0.091 
IRÍCD (H5) -0.011*** . .  -0.006** . .  -0.011*** . . 
IRÍ IDD (H6) . -0.180** .  . -0.172*** .  . -0.179** . 
IR ÍIDU (H7) . -0.325* .  . -0.087 .  . -0.462** . 
CD Í IDD   (H8) . . -0.006  . . -0.003  . . -0.003 
CD Í IDU (H9) . . -0.035*  . . -0.044**  . . -0.037* 
Controls: Base Model ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,595 1,595 1,595 
Adj. R-squared 0.447 0.447 0.445 0.435 0.437 0.435 0.462 0.463 0.459 
Mean VIF 1.221 1.266 1.766   1.243 1.281 1.821   1.244 1.278 1.819 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD) and Downstream - Upstream Institutional Distance (IDD - IDU) on acquirer 
systematic risk changes around cross-border M&As. Robust standard errors (not reported) were clustered by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Managerial Relevance of Empirical Results 
Panel A: Risk Implications of Empirical Results 








#1 High High · 
#2 High · High 
#3 Low Low · 
#4 Low · Low 
#5 · High High 
#6 · Low Low 
Risk-Increasing 
Scenarios 
#7 High Low · 
#8 High · Low 
#9 Low High · 
#10 Low · High 
#11 · High Low 
#12 · Low High 
Panel B: Illustrative Example Scenarios 
Acquirer Industry: Pre-packaged Software 
Acquirer SIC: 7372 
Acquirer Nation: USA 
 Scenario Target Industry Target Nation SIC CD ID 
Risk-Mitigating 
Scenarios 
#1 Pre-packaged Software South Korea 7372 22.05 · 
#2 Pre-packaged Software China 7372 · -1.806 
#3 Computer Peripheral Equipment Canada 3577 3.76 · 
#4 Computer Peripheral Equipment Belgium 3577 · 0.029 
#5 · Indonesia · 21.84 -2.267 
#6 · United Kingdom · 3.22 0.158 
Risk-Increasing 
Scenarios 
#7 Pre-packaged Software Canada 7372 3.76 · 
#8 Pre-packaged Software Belgium 7372 · 0.029 
#9 Computer Peripheral Equipment South Korea 3577 22.05 · 
#10 Computer Peripheral Equipment China 3577 · -1.806 
#11 · Portugal · 22.90 -0.128 
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